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EU External Relations 
 
Paul James Cardwell  University of Strathclyde 
 
Lorna Gillies  University of Strathclyde 
 
The European Union has extensive competences to engage with the world beyond its 
borders. Therefore, the UK’s own relationships with non-EU countries are deeply 
embedded in the EU institutional framework, and the process of Brexit will require 
substantial legal reform in the UK. The term ‘external relations’ in fact covers an extremely 
wide set of policies which rely on a diverse set of legal competences. For this reason, we 
tend not to use the term ‘foreign policy’ unless this refers to the ‘political’ as opposed to 
‘economic’ aspects, though even these are not always easily separated. 
 
‘External relations’ is taken to cover the Common Commercial Policy,  the powers of the EU 
to make agreements with ‘third’ – i.e. non-EU – countries, neighbourhood policy, 
development policy, relations with international institutions and what is known as the 
‘external dimension of internal policies’. The latter refers to a long-standing legal principle 
set out by the Court of Justice in Case 22-70 AETR, under which the EU has implied external 
competence where it enjoys internal competence. In addition to the wide variety of external 
competences which are scattered throughout the treaties, the legal instruments and 
institutional arrangements which apply across these areas are not the same throughout. 
This makes external relations a particularly complex area which the UK will need to extract 
itself from. We will address two of the main focal points of EU external relations: the CCP 
and the CFSP. 
 




The EU Internal Market is premised on a common customs union aided by the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital (see the (External) Trade Law chapter). 
Whilst there is no single EU commercial law,1 the CCP (found in Articles 206-207 TFEU) is an 
example of exclusive competence (Article 3(1)(e) TFEU), meaning that the UK and the other 
Member States are precluded from making individual agreements outside the EU 
framework. The Preamble to the original Treaty of Rome stated that the Contracting States 
‘desir[ed] to contribute, by a means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade.’ The process of making international 
agreements is in Article 218 TFEU. After the Treaty of Lisbon, investment is now included in 
the scope of the CCP. 
 
 
1 The closest being the European Commission’s Proposal for a Common European Sales Law, COM 





The EU’s Common Commercial Policy is now contained in Article 206 and Article 207 TFEU. 
Article 3(1)(e) explicitly confirms the exclusive competence of the EU, codifying the 
consistent case law of the CJEU to this effect. Article 206 confirms that the European 
Union’s contribution vis-à-vis world trade through: the ‘progressive abolition of restrictions 
on international trade and on foreign direct investment and, and the lowering of customs 
and other barriers’. In practice, the European Parliament and Council ‘authorise’ 
negotiations, whilst the European Commission is responsible for ‘conduct[ing]’ 
negotiations for such agreements (Article 207(3), Paras 2-3, TFEU). The European Council 
has an important role in the negotiations where such agreements impact upon internal 
rules relating to a range of services which may affect Member States’ cultural diversity or 




The Common Commercial Policy equips the EU with competence to negotiate services and 
enter into international investments with countries external to the EU. The Common 
Commercial Policy broadly focusses on international trade agreements between the EU 
and third states, and agreements on foreign direct investment. The Policy covers a range of 
commercial areas. These include rules governing anti-dumping, import and export 
controls, foreign direct investment, procurement, the export and most recently the import 
of cultural goods. The Policy is a key driver towards the EU establishing international 
investment agreements in the future. The Policy has a political as well as an economic 
objective. In response, the EU institutions recognise that action under the Common 
Commercial Policy must take account of security in exports, human rights, environmental 




The EU will continue to develop and implement its Common Commercial Policy with third 
states. However, the future success of the CCP will depend on a combination of three things. 
First, Brexit – the consequences for the UK in leaving the EU, and with it the CCP, are 
considered below. However, for the EU, the negotiations for the UK’s departure will provide 
an insight as to how the EU will treat the UK as a third state in future. The EU continues to 
stress that a future trade arrangement or agreement with the UK is dependent on the latter 
retaining internal market and customs union membership, if the UK wishes to enjoy the 
benefits of these. This also means maintaining the adjudicative authority of the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU). The UK is seeking to secure bilateral trade arrangements with the 
EU and third states, including agreement on binding arbitration. However, at the time of 
writing, any agreements between the UK and the EU on free trade will not be considered by 
EU negotiators until the UK has left the EU.  
 
Second, the process of implementation of the EU’s recent free trade agreements with 
Canada and Singapore may provide an indication as to the extent – perceived or actual – of 
the EU’s future influence on free trade, foreign direct investment and investment 
arbitration agreements. This point is particularly pertinent given the apparent rise in 
protectionism promoted by President Donald Trump in the US, and the interpretation in 
many parts of the globe that the UK (via the Brexit vote) has turned away from its traditional 
emphasis on free trade. Third, the political ambitions of the EU in furtherance of internal 
financial integration and enlargement will be important.2 The ability of the EU to undertake 
bilateral treaties on behalf of its Member States is crucial to supporting further enlargement 
through increasing market access to new accession states and vice versa. 
 
Common Commercial Policy and Brexit 
 
The CCP was possibly the only area of external relations which was prominent in the 
referendum debate, generally characterised as the rights of the EU institutions to make 
‘trade deals’ on behalf of the EU as a whole. The CCP had been strongly supported by 
successive UK governments, given the collective weight of the EU acting as a whole. It is 
therefore surprising that the CCP was portrayed in a rather negative light in the referendum 
campaign and the subsequent negotiations. The EU institutions, particularly the 
Commission, have developed extensive expertise in trade negotiations. The Member 
States, including the UK, have ‘fed into’ the process of negotiations to ensure that the EU 
position reflects national positions. Brexit therefore means that the UK will no longer be 
part of the agreements – or the negotiations. 
 
As with other dimensions of EU law, the institutional competences are not always 
straightforward. For many years, questions have been raised about agreements with third 
countries which go beyond the parameters set out in the CCP. These are termed ‘mixed 
agreements’. Since the Brexit vote, the CJEU gave an opinion on the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) between the EU and Singapore which stated that where aspects of agreements are 
based on shared competences, then the Member States need to be involved. This matters 
for Brexit, since future agreements with the EU will straddle a variety of competences. 
 
The best known recent examples of agreements under CCP competences are the EU-
Canada agreement (‘CETA’) and the EU-US agreement (‘TTIP’) neither of which is in force 
and both of which have proved controversial. Whilst leaving the EU would, in theory, free 
the UK from the often cumbersome procedures of negotiating an agreement with another 
country that has to satisfy 28 Member States, the UK would nevertheless have to discuss 
terms with the other party. 
 
An analysis by the Financial Times suggests that there are an estimated 759 agreements 
which are currently operated by the EU and, though not all were concluded under the CCP, 
all will need to be renegotiated and replaced by the UK, simply to remain in the same 
position. These range from comprehensive free trade agreements with countries such as 
Vietnam, Mexico and South Korea, to technical, sectoral agreements with countries across 
the globe. Although the UK is a member of the WTO, it joined as a member of the EU and 
 
2 On enlargement, the accession of Croatia to the EU has resulted in a number of proposed Council 
Decisions for Economic Partnership Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with 
third states: see COM (2017) 382, COM (2017) 81, COM (2017) 82 
there is some debate about whether the transfer of competences would require the assent 
of the other WTO members. 
 
By leaving the EU and the single market, the UK will no longer be a party to these 
agreements. The UK government’s current approach is to try to ‘cut and paste’ EU 
agreements and replicate the text of the agreements with the respective third countries for 
agreement. But this is also dependent of the agreement of the third country and any 
domestic legal process they must go through. There are also major practical difficulties in 
negotiating agreements from scratch for the UK, which does not employ the number of 
specialists and negotiators needed. 
 
Once the UK has left the EU, it will be able to seek individual agreements with third states 
but, whilst it continues to be a member of the EU, it cannot formally start this process since 
it would be contrary to EU law. Although it is perhaps unlikely that the Commission (or other 
Member States) would seek to enforce EU law to prevent the UK doing so – the ability of the 
UK to, at the same time, negotiate with the EU on the exit agreement and enter into detailed 
discussions with states across the globe is a practical impossibility. 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) 
 
The CFSP was incorporated into the law of the EU by the Treaty on European Union in 1992. 
However, it has always had a ‘special’ character within the treaty arrangements. Before the 
Treaty of Lisbon, it was the second of three ‘pillars’ of the EU’s legal order: the first being 
the Community pillar, which contained the law on the single market, competition, and 
environment, and which used the familiar regulations and directives. Such legal 
instruments do not apply in the CFSP. It has generally been regarded as an area of 
‘intergovernmental’ cooperation, rather than ‘supranational’ integration. Although the 
Treaty points to the CFSP covering ‘all areas of foreign policy’, in reality there is not the 
same pooling of sovereignty as in other areas. 
 
Successive UK governments have resisted any attempts to allow the CFSP to become less 
intergovernmental. Partly this can be explained by the UK’s belief in the value of the EU as 
a trade-focused polity, which provided its motivation for eventually joining the club. But 
also because of the UK’s own long-standing place on the global stage, as demonstrated by 
its permanent UN Security Council seat, role in NATO and close alliance with the United 
States and, to a lesser and declining extent, countries of the Commonwealth. Unlike smaller 
EU states, the UK has seen no need to use the CFSP as a means of gaining visibility in 
international affairs (though this does not preclude the ability to use the CFSP to amplify 
national foreign policy, as discussed below). The UK has consistently expressed a constant 
fear from the outset that the institutionalisation of the CFSP would be used as a means of 
usurping national foreign policy. 
 
In Prime Minister Theresa May’s letter to European Council President Tusk which triggered 
Article 50 TEU of 29 March 2017, there was no mention of the words ‘foreign policy’. 
However, the following extract gained significant attention: 
 
We want to make sure that Europe remains strong and prosperous and is capable of 
projecting its values, leading in the world, and defending itself from security threats. We 
want the United Kingdom, through a new deep and special partnership with a strong 
European Union, to play its full part in achieving these goals. We therefore believe it is 
necessary to agree the terms of our future partnership alongside those of our withdrawal 
from the European Union. 
 
These words were taken in some quarters as the UK using its relative military and 
security/intelligence strengths as a means of threatening the EU to offer a ‘good’ exit deal. 
The EU’s negotiating guidelines for Brexit note that, ‘The EU stands ready to establish 
partnerships in areas unrelated to trade, in particular the fight against terrorism and 
international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.’ The framing of ‘areas 
unrelated to trade’ clearly demonstrates that the CFSP, including defence, are not likely to 
be the primary areas for discussion (or indeed difficulty) during the Brexit negotiations. 
Indeed, the categorisation of foreign policy here as the ‘other’ suggests that CFSP is not an 
area where the EU expects great attention to be devoted. 
 
in September 2017, the uk government published a position paper on Brexit’s implications 
for foreign policy, defence and development. In theory, this should be less problematic than 
in many other areas: since diplomatic missions, armed forces and even policy statements 
have remained separate from the CFSP and European External Action Service, the 
‘extraction’ from the EU should not entail lengthy debates. but the paper stresses the 
shared challenges the uk and eu face and the desire to work as closely together as possible 
after Brexit. 
 
There are nevertheless important and potentially complex issues to resolve and which, in 
addition to the points raised above, connect the CFSP to policies on aid and development, 
trade, sanctions, climate change, and energy, all of which rely on overlapping competences 
in the treaties. Therefore, whilst it might be debated what the ‘law’ in CFSP consists of, there 
is little doubt that the regular ‘law’ in other dimensions of integration will not make 
extraction from the CFSP straightforward in reality. 
 
A particular headache is the imposition of restrictive measures (sanctions), of which there 
are over 30 in place. These depend on measures taken under the CFSP, followed up by a 
regulation. They include measures placed by the EU on countries such as Russia and 
individuals suspected of funding terrorism. The UK will need to find a way to replicate these, 
which will also depend heavily on the relationship – should there be one – between the UK 
and EU single market and/or customs union, and whether this is a temporary or permanent 
solution. Restrictive measures are therefore one extremely diverse category which 
represents a highly complex legal issue to be resolved, in addition to the administrative, 
budgetary and operational issues of the CFSP. There is also a link between foreign policy 
and information sharing within the EU context which would require an agreement on 
cooperation to continue (see the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Justice 
chapter). 
 
The situation that the UK and the EU find themselves in is thus unprecedented. 
Furthermore, there is no obvious model upon which future EU-UK relations regarding the 
CFSP can easily be based. Much depends on the political will of the two sides to decide to 
work on areas of common interest, which would therefore provide an impetus to resolve 
the institutional questions. This is dependent of course on the UK’s own vision of a ‘Global 
Britain’. 
 
Whitman identifies three possible scenarios for the UK in the CFSP post-Brexit: as an 
‘integrated player’, ‘associated partner’ or ‘detached observer’. In the first, the UK would 
have a bespoke, special status in which it would retain involvement in battlegroups, CSDP 
operations (as a ‘reverse Denmark position’) and participation in the Foreign Affairs Council 
for relevant matters. But, of course, it would be outside the mainstream fora for discussion 
and strategic direction. 
 
As an ‘associated partner’, its position would be closer to that of Norway, having no 
membership of the Foreign Affairs Council but a ‘dialogue’ on related issues. Whilst it would 
still have the opportunity to participate in battlegroups and the European Defence Agency 
via specific agreements, this would appear to be a functional arrangement with little or no 
influence over policy-making. At the lowest end of the scale, a ‘detached observer’ would 
mean that the UK would not participate in any institutional formats and would probably be 
limited to participation in civilian missions on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In any of these scenarios, Brexit means that the UK would lack any capability to steer the 
direction of the CFSP. Even being free of the ‘political baggage’ of being too closely 
associated with EU missions in this area of closely guarded national sovereignty, we do not 
yet know to what extent the UK could conceivably play a constructive role and how 
receptive the rest of the EU27 will be. As Dijkstra has noted, the operational, technical and 
administrative implications cannot be fully considered until the ‘big picture’ political 
questions are settled. 
 
at the meta-level it might, in theory, be possibly for a joint dialogue between the UK and EU 
on an agreed strategic approach to foreign policy. However, this would seem to be counter-
intuitive to the purpose of Brexit and the mantra of ‘taking back control’ which was so 
prominent in the referendum campaign. Since the effectiveness of placing resilience at the 
core of EU foreign relies on the coherence of the EU’s institutions, instruments and policies, 
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